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In conventional quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, security is guaranteed by es-
timating the amount of leaked information through monitoring signal disturbance, which,
in practice, is generally caused by environmental noise and device imperfections rather
than eavesdropping. Such estimation therefore tends to overrate the amount of leaked in-
formation in practice, leads to a fundamental threshold of the bit error rate. The threshold
becomes a bottleneck of the development of practical QKD systems. In classical com-
munication, according to Shannon’s communication theory, information can transform
through a noisy channel even if the background noise is very strong compare to the signal
and hence the threshold of the bit error rate tends to 50%1. One might wonder whether a
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QKD scheme can also tolerate error rate as high as 50%. The question is answered affir-
matively with the recent work of round-robin differential phase-shift (RRDPS) protocol2, 3,
which breaks through the fundamental threshold of the bit error rate and indicates an-
other potential direction in the field of quantum cryptography. The key challenge to re-
alize the RRDPS scheme lies on the measurement device, which requires a variable-delay
interferometer. The delay needs to be chosen from a set of predetermined values ran-
domly. Such measurement can be realized by switching between many interferometers
with different delays at a high speed in accordance with the system repetition rate. The
more delay values can be chosen from, the higher error rate can be tolerated. By design-
ing an optical system with multiple switches and employing an active phase stabilization
technology, we successfully construct a variable-delay interferometer with 128 actively
selectable delays. With this measurement, we experimentally demonstrate the RRDPS
QKD protocol and obtain a final key rate of 15.54 bps via a total loss of 18 dB and 8.9%
error rate. Our experiment demonstrates that the RRDPS QKD protocol is practical with
current technology.
In a QKD protocol, the sender, Alice, sends a quantum signal through an untrusted quan-
tum channel. The receiver, Bob, measures the arrived quantum signal and obtains the raw key.
Because of the device imperfections, environmental interference and possibly eavesdropping,
the raw keys of Alice and Bob maybe not be identical or private. In the security analysis, the
disturbance of the signal is quantified by the bit flip error rate, ebit, and the leaked information
is quantified by the phase error rate, eph. To ensure the final keys are identical and secure, a
proper postprocessing 4, 5 should be performed. After performing the error correction, which re-
moves the disturbances, and one should apply privacy amplification, which removes the leaked
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information. The final key generation rate per raw key bit is given by5,
R = 1−H(ebit)−H(eph). (1)
When the error rates, ebit and eph, exceeds some thresholds, the key rate becomes zero or nega-
tive and hence no secure keys can be generated.
In conventional QKD protocols, security is guaranteed by the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle which guarantees that any attempts of eavesdropping the quantum channel would in-
evitably cause quantum signal disturbances. Therefore, the leaked information obtained by an
eavesdropper, Eve, can be upper-bounded by the disturbance of the signal. In the Bennett-
Brassard-1984 (BB84) protocol, due to its symmetry, the phase error rate is estimated by the
bit error rate eph = ebit and hence the final key rate, in Eq. (1), is given by R = 1 − 2H(ebit).
When ebit > 11%, the final key rate approaches to 0. Hence, the bit error rate threshold for
the BB84 protocol is 11% using the above postprocessing. Note that with other postprocess-
ing techniques6, a higher bit error rate threshold can be obtained. Nevertheless, there exists
a fundamental limitation on the error rate threshold7. It is widely believed that secure QKD
cannot be achieved when the background noise is too strong compare to the signal. In practice,
the strength of background noise can be considered as a constant, whereas the strength of the
signal exponentially decreases with an increasing transmission distance. Hence, the error rate
threshold puts a fundamental limit on the secure transmission distance. From a realistic point
of view, most of disturbances are caused by the environment noises and device imperfections
instead of eavesdropping. Thus the leaked information is often overestimated, which is the root
for the limit on the error rate threshold.
In classical communication, according to Shannon’s communication theory, such error
rate limit does not exist as long as ebit 6= 50%1. One might wonder whether a QKD scheme
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can also tolerate error rate as high as 50%. Recently, a new QKD protocol2 called RRDPS
was proposed, which is essentially evolved from the differential phase-shift (DPS) protocol8, 9.
Surprisingly, with the new protocol, secure key can be generated even if the bit flip error rate
close to 50%.
The schematic diagram of the RRDPS QKD scheme is shown in Fig. 1. Alice prepares
a pulse train containing L pulses, encodes the (random) key information into the phase of each
pulse, 0 or pi, and sends it to Bob, who splits the L-pulse train into two with a beam splitter.
Bob randomly shifts (backward or forward) one of the split pulse trains by d pulses where
1 ≤ d ≤ L − 1, and interferes them. The detection result that Bob obtains essentially reveals
the phase difference between two pulses i and i± d, where + stands for shifting forward and −
stands for backward. The key rate of the RRDPS QKD protocol is given by3
R = Q [1−H(ebit)−HPA] , (2)
where R is the final key bit per L-pulse train. In experiment, the average number of valid
detections per L-pulse train, Q, can be measured directly. In Method, we show how to estimate
the privacy amplification term HPA.
In this letter, we demonstrate the RRPDS QKD protocol with L = 128. The setup is
shown in Fig. 2. On sender side, a continuous-wave (CW) external cavity laser (ECL) is em-
ployed as the optical source. The central wavelength of the ECL is 1550.12nm with a linewidth
below 2kHz, which can provide a coherence time beyond 500µs. This CW laser is modulated
by an amplitude modulator (AM, Photline 10GHz) in order to produce a 128-pulse train. The
pulses, with a full width at half maximum (FWHM) of 300ps, are separated by 2ns. Thus the
overall duration of a pulse train (also a round) is about 256ns. A phase modulator (PM, Photline
10GHz) is employed to encode a random phase shift, 0 or pi, on each pulse.
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On receiver side, an interferometer with variable delays is constructed in order to perform
different interference measurements, as shown in Fig. 2. The required delay time is a discrete
value in {2ns, 4ns, · · · , 254ns}. Seven delay gates, denoted as DGi for i ∈ {1, · · · , 7} with a
fixed delay fibre that can delay an optical pulse for a time of 2i × 2ns, are arranged to achieve
the 128-value dynamic delays. The length of delay path is carefully adjusted to ensure that
pulses with and without delay can overlap well. Meanwhile, the coupling efficiency of every
pair of collimators is above 90% to ensure the intensity of pulses undergoing different numbers
of delay gates as closely as possible. The seven delay gates are controlled by a 7-bit random
number. By making use of these delay gates, we realize any dynamic discrete delay time from
the set of {0ns, 2ns, 4ns · · · , 254ns}, which includes all the required values of our experiment.
Each delay gate is constructed by a pockels cell, a fibre with fixed length and two polar-
izing beam splitters(PBS) as input port and output port, as shown in Fig. 2. The pockels cell
contains two RTP crystals. Each pockels cell is controlled by a customized high voltage pulse
generator to achieve a fast switch between 0 V and half-wave voltage which is around 2100 V.
For each one of delay gates, if the control bit is 0, the pockels cell will not affect the arrived
pulses which will lead to pass through the output PBS and no delay happened. If the control
bit is 1, the pockels cell will be driven by the half-wave voltage to convert the polarization state
of arrived photons from horizontal (|H〉) to vertical (|V 〉). Thus the pulses will be reflected by
the output PBS and propagate through the delay fibre. The delay gate of 2 ns (DG1) is ob-
tained by a free-space optical link of ∼ 0.6 m. The other delay gates of longer than 2 ns are
obtained by the fibres with appropriate lengths. After reflected by the input PBS, the pulses
pass through the half-wave voltage pockels cell again leading to convert the polarization back
to |H〉 and pass through the output PBS. These seven delay gates are distributed in both arms of
the interferometer to balance the transmittance. Some PBSs are shared between two neighbour
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gates.
After interfered at a fibre beam splitter (FBS), the pulses are detected by two custom up-
convert single photon detectors10 (SPD). By interacted with 1950nm pump laser in a PPLN
waveguide, 1550 nm single photons are up-converted to 863 nm and then detected by commer-
cial Si-based single photon detectors. The output of the SPDs are recorded by a high-speed
and high-accuracy time-to-digital converter (TDC). The overall detection efficiency of the up-
convert detector is around 10%, and the dark count is lower than 200cps.
In this experiment, we have realized a dynamic interferometer with 128 delays on mea-
surement site. All of these possible interferometers require stability in the sub-wavelength
order to perform high visibility interference measurements. To suppress mechanical vibration
and temperature drift from the optical table and air, we employ a frame with thermal insulation
and the high-damping material to envelop the interferometer. With these passive phase stabil-
isation methods, 128 kinds of unequal-arm interferometers can maintain a visibility of higher
than 96% for a time period in the order of ten seconds, depending on the delay d. The residual
phase instability is mainly due to the drift of the central wavelength of the laser. Therefore,
to implement a complete RRDPS QKD experimental demonstration, an active phase-locking
technique is required. On sender side, an additional path without modulation of AM and PM,
which is named phase-locking light with a relatively higher intensity of about 60 million pho-
tons per second, is introduced by an FBS and an optical switch. The phase-locking light is
switched on for 340 ms per second is used for phase-locking to calibrate the interferometers.
The rest 660 ms per second is used for QKD. During phase-locking, the 128 delays are tra-
versed by turning on the specific Pockels Cells. PM2 is deployed to adjust the relative phase
between two arms of the interferometers. For each delay, the optimal compensate voltage of
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PM2 is measured and recorded by a custom Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) in the
control board (see Methods). The recorded compensate voltages are used to maintain the rela-
tive phase unchanged against different delay selections and central wavelength drift. With the
active phase-locking technique, the visibility of most interferometers can be maintained over
96% for hours simultaneously, as shown in Fig. 3a.
In this letter, the experiment is demonstrated through a 1 km fibre link. The intensity of
each pulse is 0.00625 and the total intensity of the L-pulse train is 0.8. The repetition rate of
pulse trains is 10 kHz. With 34% of time used for calibration, 6600 pulse trains are transmitted
per second. In the experiment, we obtain 675, 937 bits sifted keys in total. The bit flip error rates
with different random delays r, e(r)bit , are shown in Fig.3b. Due to the unbalance of the two arms
of interferometer, there are fluctuation of the bit error rates with different delays. Interestingly,
the bit error rate depends on the delay r and the overall error rate is 8.9%. The total number of
the rounds sent is 103679400 and finally 2.441× 105 bits of security key is generated in 15709
seconds. Therefore, the key generation rate is given by 15.54 bps.
Recently, another RRDPS QKD protocol is proposed and experimentally demosntrated11.
Difference from the original RRDPS protocol, the random delay is chosen passively. A full
scale comparison between two protocols is an interesting prospective project.
Methods
Privacy amplification estimation. Our postprocessing essentially follows the improved result3
as well as the original one2. The phase error rate of the RRDPS QKDprotocol is solely deter-
mined by the source preparation. To be more specific, the leaked information Eve can obtained
is upper-bound by the photon-number of the state Alice prepares in an L-pulse train2. In the
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case that the photon-number in an L-pulse train is a constant, a tighter bound of the phase error
rate can be obtained by considering more details of the source3.
enph =
1− (1− 2/L)n
2
, (3)
where n is the total number of photons in the L-pulse train.
In the experiment, the weak coherent source is used as the source whose photon-number
follows a Poisson distribution. When considering the worst case, we assume that Bob only
receives high-photon number states, whose photon number is bigger than nth, and losses always
come from all the low-photon number states, whose photon number is smaller than nth. Then
QHph , the cost of privacy amplification per round, is given by
QHPA ≤ QnthH(e
nth
ph ) +
∞∑
n=nth+1
e−µ
(µ)n
n!
H(enph),
Qnth = Q−
∞∑
n=nth+1
e−µ
(µ)n
n!
.
(4)
where enthph and enph can be upper-bounded according to Eq. (3). And nth is the threshold photon
number satisfy the total gain, Q, can be determined by contributions of the terms whose photon
numbers are at least nth.
Active phase stabilization. The output intensity of one port of a Mach-Zehnder interfer-
ometer can be expressed as I
2
(1+cosϕr), where I is the input power and ϕr is the relative phase
between two paths for each delay r. The active phase stabilization technique is aimed to mea-
sure the value of ϕr at phase-locking stage and compensate it by using a PM at QKD stage. To
realize the measurement, the PM is set to apply extra phases of ϕkext = 2kN pi where k ∈ 0, 1, ..., N
sequentially, corresponding to output intensity of Ik = I2(1+cos(ϕr+ϕ
k
ext)). For each voltage,
the counting rate of two single photon detectors, Ck1 and Ck2 are recorded by FPGA. To deter-
mine ϕr, a least squares method is used to achieve the minimal of S(ϕr) =
∑
k (Ik −
Ck
1
Ck
1
+Ck
2
)2.
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N is chosen to be 4 in this experiment. Due to the imperfection, such as nonlinear of the
voltage-phase mapping and fluctuations of photon number counting, the calculated compensate
voltage of PM is usually not precise enough. The compensate voltage is then searched around
the calculated value for a few steps to obtain a more suitable one. Finally, a lookup table is built
to store the compensate voltages for each delay.
Time sequence control. The setup of Alice’s side and Bob’s side are controlled by two
independent FPGA based on integrated control boards, CBa and CBb. The phase-locking light
is switched on for 340ms as the phase-locking stage. During this stage, Bob traversals each
value of r by switch on specific delay gates to measure the compensation phase ϕr. After
phase-locking, Alice switches photon source to pulse mode which is modulated by AM and
PM. The AM is directly controlled by amplified RF signal output from Arbitrary Waveform
Generators(AWG), which is synchronized by CBa, to generate pulses separated by 2ns with the
FWHM of 300ps. Random numbers are generated by a QRNG module on CBa and transmitted
to the AWG to compile as PM controlling waveform. The repetition rate of round is 10kHz
in our experiment, thus phase encoded 128-pulse trains are produced per 100µs. The start of
rounds for AWG andCBb are triggered byCBa separately. At the beginning of per round, 7 bits
of quantum random number generated by QRNG module on CBb are consumed to determine
the delay r. Specific delay gates are turned on to construct the time delay. And PM2 is set to
the related voltage stored in the look-up table. Due to the slow rising time of the pockels cells, it
takes 90µs to wait before trigger Alice’s pulses to ensure the delay gates are precisely switched
before. Finally, the trigger signal and the output of up-conversion detectors are recorded by a
TDC on CBb.
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Table 1: The experimental experimental parameters and results of our RRDPS experiment.
Total rounds Sifted key Q ν e(mean)bit L Final key length
103,679,400 675,937 0.00652 0.8 8.9% 128 2.441× 105
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Figure 1: Schematic diagram of RRDPS QKD proposal. State preparation: Alice gener-
ates an L-pulse train by modulating a narrow linewidth continuous-wave (CW) laser with an
amplitude modulator (AM). Then random phase shift of 0 or pi is performed in each pulse. Af-
ter attenuating the intensity of an L-pulse train to a preset ν, the L-pulse train is transmitted
to Bob through a fibre channel. Measurement: Bob generates two random numbers: c from
{0, 1}, which denotes the direction of the delay, and d from {1, 2, . . . , L−1}, which denotes the
length of the delay. Then the arrived pulse train is split into two with a beamsplitter (BS) and
a random delay of r′ = (−1)cd pulses is applied to one of the split trains. Then the two pulse
trains are combined on a beam splitter, performed an interference measurement and obtained a
index, i,of the pulse which is detected a photon together with the sifted key si ⊕ s(i+r′ mod L).
Announcement: Bob announces i and (i+r mod L) so that Alice can calculate the sifted key
si ⊕ s(i+r′ mod L).
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Figure 2: Experimental setup. ECL: external cavity laser; AM: amplitude modulator; PM:
phase modulator; ATT: attenuator; (F) PBS: (fibre) polarizing beam splitter; FBS: fibre beam
splitter; OS: optical switch; HWP: half-wave plate; PC: pockels cell; DG: delay gate; WDM:
wavelength division multiplexing. The 7 delay gates are implemented by 6 fibre links with
appropriate length and a free-space link. 7 pockels cells are deployed to control the state of
each delay gate. The interference measurement is performed on FBS2 and completed on two
up-conversion detectors, whose details are shown in the middle of Bob’s setup.
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Figure 3: a, The phase stability with active phase locking over several hours. For most values
of d, for example d = 15 and d = 100, the visibility is maintained above 96%. For certain delay
such as d = 128, the relative phase becomes a little more unstable. b, e(r)bit over 128 logical
delays. The mean error rate is 8.9%. In our experimental configuration of RRDPS QKD, the
key rate keeps positive for each delay.
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